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Yang v. Maugans: Just When You Thought It Was Safe to Get in the
Water
I.

Introduction
America has long been the mecca of hope and freedom to which
millions of immigrants and refugees have traveled, both legally and
illegally. Paradoxically, this nation of immigrants has often been
reluctant to open its doors and welcome new generations of immigrants. Perhaps not surprisingly, recent federal court decisions have
just made it more difficult for refugees to enter the United States and
enjoy the freedom that we too often take for granted.1 The decisions
involved the Golden Venture smuggling ship which grounded off the
coast of New York resulting in hundreds of illegal Chinese aliens
jumping overboard and trying to swim ashore.' In general terms, the
appellate court rulings reflect America's ambivalence and antagonism
toward those who try to smuggle their way into the United States. The
judicial decisions also embody the political pressure and intrigue which
surround the sensitive issue of immigration in our society.3
In You Yi Yang v. Maugans,4 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rendered a narrow interpretation of what constitutes "entry"
into the United States pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 (INA).5 Under the appellate court ruling, a refugee does not

I You Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540 (3d Cir. 1995); Xin-CChang Zhang v. Slattery,
55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995); Chen Zou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995).
2 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1544.
3 According to testimony filed in a U.S. District Court in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the
Clinton White House pressured immigration judges to hurry through cases concerning
Chinese immigrants aboard the Golden Venture White House may have pressuredjudges, CENT.
PENN. Bus.J., Dec. 15, 1995, at 1. Attorneys for the immigrants obtained evidence they felt
suggested improper activities by the White House and the U.S. Department of Justice. .Id.
It is alleged that the White House wanted to make an example of the Chinese immigrants
to show that the Administration was "tough" on illegal immigration. Id. The attorneys for
Chinese aliens argued that it was impossible for the immigrants to receive a fair hearing. Id.
See also Lawsuit Stalls U.S. Bid to Speed up Chinese Asylum Cases, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 21, 1994, at
A8.
4 Yang, 68 F.3d 1540 (3d Cir. 1995).
5 INA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1994). Determining whether one has entered the
United States has a significant impact on those wishing to stay in America. If one has entered
then he is entitled to a deportation hearing rather than just an exclusion proceeding. Yang,
68 F.3d at 1552 (Sarokin,J., dissenting). A deportable alien is determined to be within our
borders and is, therefore, entitled to the protections of the Constitution. Id. (Sarokin, J.,
dissenting).
Deportation proceedings are generally more favorable to the alien than exclusion
proceedings. Rights available in deportation but not exclusion include advance
notice of the charges, a burden of proof placed on the government, direct appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the right to seek suspension of the order, and the right to
designate the country of destination ....
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enter into the United States merely by penetrating "United States
territorial waters without being detected or pursued by authorities."6
Further, the Third Circuit refused to overturn the Board of Immigration Appeals's (BIA) decision that the alien, not the government, has
the burden of proving that all three elements of the entry test have
been satisfied.7
Judge Sarokin dissented from the majority opinion regarding both
issues.' The dissent broadened the scope of inquiry by stating that
"[t]he issue is not whether physical presence alone constitutes entry,
but rather whether the first prong of the three-prong entry analysis is
met by crossing into the territorial waters of the United States."9
Judge Sarokin also argued that the BIA's placement of the burden of
proof on the alien to establish entry was unreasonable and thus should
not be granted deference by the court.1 0
This Note examines the court's statutory interpretation of "entry"
in Yang." Part II of the Note presents the procedural history and
facts of the Yang case." In Part III, the Note discusses the relevant
background law relating to the present case. 3 Next, in Part IV, the
Note analyzes the majority's rationale and compares it to the dissenting
argument. 4 Finally, in Part V the Note concludes that the Third
Circuit correctly limited physical presence to dry land; however, its
decision to place
the burden of proof of "entry" solely on the alien was
15
unreasonable.

II.

The Facts of Yang and the Third Circuit's Decision
On June 6, 1993, two night patrol officers of the U.S. Department
of Interior Park Police observed a distressed ship in the frigid waters
near Queens, New York. 6 The ill-fated Golden Venture had sailed from
Thailand to the United States with its human cargo of Chinese
immigrants." Authorities were notified of the grounded ship and of
the hundreds of disoriented passengers feverishly trying to reach dry

Id. (SarokinJ., dissenting).
6 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1543.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 1552 (Sarokin, J., dissenting).
9 Id. (SarokinJ., dissenting).
10 Id. at 1557 (Sarokin,J., dissenting).
11 See supra notes 34-51, 54-97, 118-68, 194-96 and accompanying
12 See supra notes 16-53 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 54-116 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 117-86 and accompanying text.
15 See supra notes 187-96 and accompanying text.
16 Sing Chou Chung v. Reno, 886 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (M.D. Pa.
17 Id. at 1176 n.3. The ship sailed for over 100 days, and it is
passenger aboard the Golden Venture paid more than $20,000 or agreed
servant for the opportunity to come to America. Id,

text.

1995).
estimated that each
to be an indentured
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land.'
Soon thereafter, "a formidable array of law enforcement
officers" arrived to secure the beach area on which the Chinese
immigrants were likely to land. 9 All of the petitioners0 in the
present case did reach the shore but were unable to journey beyond
the beach area due to exhaustion and the presence of police officers.2 The Chinese immigrants were subsequently placed in the
custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); most
were taken to York County Prison, including the 22petitioners, where
they have remained for over twenty-seven months.
While in prison, Sing Chou Chung and numerous other Chinese
detainees filed claims for asylum. 3 Exclusion proceedings were
24
instituted against Sing Chou Chung and the other detainees.
Chung moved to prevent exclusion proceedings on the ground that he
had entered the United States and thus was entitled to a deportation26
hearing. 5 The motion was denied by the immigration judge.
Chung appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) which affirmed the judge's ruling on January 13, 1994.27
Following the BIA affirmation, Chung and five other Chinese
immigrants filed a habeus corpus petition in the
United States District
28
Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
The district court reversed the BIA's ruling and ordered that
Chung and the five other petitioners were entitled to deportation

18 Id. Although most of the people who reached the beach were too exhausted to go
further, it is estimated that thirty passengers fled into the surrounding community before
police could seal off the beach area. Id.
19 You Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1544 (3d Cir. 1995). A police cordon was
established extending roughly one half of a mile along the beach and extending 600 yards
inland in an effort to seal off the beach perimeters. Id. at 1551 (Sarokin,J., dissenting).
20 Dek Fun Lin, Shimu Chen, Wu Chao, Shan Zao, Sing Chou Chung, and Dar Hwa
Wang.
21 Id. at 1551 (Sarokin, J., dissenting). One petitioner, Shan Zhao, claimed to have
almost walked to a nearby street before being detained by an official. Id. (Sarokin,J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 1552 (Sarokin,J., dissenting). In November of 1995, the captain of the Golden
Venture and 21 crew members were convicted in federal court for attempting to smuggle
immigrants into the United States. New Arrest in Chinese Smuggling Tragedy, WASH. POST, Nov.
15, 1995, at A7. Also, the alleged ring-leader of the smuggling operation, Lee Peng Fei, was
arrested in Thailand. Id. He could face up to 85 years in prison and $2.5 million in fines
if convicted. Id.
23 Sing Chou Chung v. Reno, 886 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
24 Id. Aliens are entitled to either a hearing or an exclusion proceeding in order to
determine their deportability. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1994).
25 Chung,886 F. Supp. at 1175. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
26 Chung,886 F.Supp. at 1175.
27

Id.

28 Id. Over 100 passengers from the Golden Venture filed habeas corpus petitions in this
district court, pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act §106(b), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(b)(1994). You Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1545. The district court
consolidated all current and future habeas corpus petitions from the Golden Venture
passengers detained in York County Prison. Yang, 68 F.3d at 1545.
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proceedings.2 9
Chief Judge Rambo, relying on an earlier case
decided by the Third Circuit, 0 concluded that the immigrants had
entered the United States and were, therefore, entitled to the more
favorable deportation proceeding."' In addition, the district court
held that the BIA should not have placed the burden of proof on the
petitioner to prove more "than that he physically entered the United
States at a point distant from an inspection station."32
The government appealed the district court's decision to the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.3 3 The Third Circuit considered two
issues on appeal: (1) whether an entry may be effectuated by encroaching upon United States territorial waters, and (2) whether the burden
of proof was properly placed on the alien.34 Judge Cowen, writing for
the majority, concluded that the district court had erred. in its
judgment on both issues.33 The Third Circuit held that "petitioners
could not have effected an 'entry' into the United States until they
reached dry land... [and] the petitioners have the burden of proving
that they meet all the requirements of 'entry."' 36 In reaching its
decision on the entry issue, the court relied upon two cases decided by
the Second and the Fourth circuits earlier the same year.37 The Yang
court agreed with the two earlier decisions which held that an alien
must be on dry land before physical presence can occur.3 8 The
majority also ruled that the district court's reliance on an earlier Third
Circuit case 9 regarding entry was misplaced since that case was
decided prior to changes made by Congress to the immigration laws
in 1952.40 Finally, the Third Circuit suggested that Congress intentionally omitted territorial water from the current statute which
defined the term "United States."4 ' The court reasoned that the
omission of "territorial waters" from the definition of the United States
2

Sing Chou Chung v. Reno, 886 F. Supp. 1172, 1185 (M.D. Pa. 1995).

30 United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1954) (holding that a crew member
of a ship had entered the United States when the ship arrived in Philadelphia).
31 Chung, 886 F. Supp. at 1185.
32 Id. at 1185.
33 You Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1546 (3d Cir. 1995).
34 Id.

35 Id.
36 Id. at 1550.
37 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that immigration
laws are meant to apply only to those activities which occur on land); Chen Zhou Chai v.
Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the mere presence of an alien in U.S.
territorial waters does not effectuate entry into the country).
38 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1549.
39 United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1954).
40 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548.

41 Id. Section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(38)(1994) defines the United States as follows: "The term 'United States,' except
as otherwise specifically herein provided, when used in a geographical sense, means the
continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the
United States." Id.
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found in section 101 of the INA42 was intentional because other
waters" in their
sections of the INA" expressly include "territorial
44
definitions as they pertain to the issue of "entry."
On the issue of who should carry the burden of proof for
establishing entry, the Third Circuit held that "[t]he BIA's interpretation of burden of proof provisions of the INA is entitled to deference
under the standards set forth in Chevron."45 The court stated that the
BIA decision was not unreasonable and therefore should not be
overturned.4 6
Judge Sarokin dissented from the majority on both issues.47 He
argued that "the majority misreads the current statute when it
concludes that the term 'United States' for purposes of entry does not
include territorial waters ....,,4'The dissent further criticized the
majority for violating its own precedent4 9 by holding that one must
reach dry land before physical presence is actualized. ° Judge Saroki
wrote that he would have held that the Chinese immigrants had
entered the United States and were entitled to deportation proceed52
The dissent then addressed the burden of proof issue.
ings.5
Judge Sarokin found BIA's statutory interpretation of placing the
entire burden on petitioners to be "unreasonable, impossible and
5
inequitable," and therefore undeserving of any deference. "
III. Background Law
A.

What Constitutes "Entry"into the United States

The "entry" fiction was created in order for immigration officials
to manage the overwhelming number of people immigrating to the
United States. 4 It helps immigration officials to differentiate between

42 Id. This is the section of the INA which regulates what constitutes "entry" into the
United States.
43 The majority

cited

the

definition

of "United

States"

found

at

8

U.S.C.

§ 1185(c)(1994) to support its argument. That section states that the definition of the
United States "includes the Canal Zone, and all territory and waters, continental or insular,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Id.

44 You Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1548 (3d Cir. 1995).
45 Id. at 1546 (citing Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
See infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory
(1984)).
interpretation guidelines articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron.
%r Yang, 68 F.3d at 1546.

Id. (Sarokin, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. at 1553 (Sarokin, J.,
See U.S. v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1954).
50 Id. at 1553 (Sarokin, J., dissenting).
51 Id. (Sarokin, J.,
dissenting).
52 Id. at 1557 (Sarokin,J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 1558 (Sarokin, J., dissenting).
54 Mitchell Scott Bloom, Note, The DisproportionateEffect of the Entry Fiction on Excludable
Aliens, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 271, 277 (1989).
47
48
49
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those who have some connection with the United States and those who
do not: "[t]he immigration laws attempt to balance the rights of aliens,
who have no connection to the United States, with the interests of the
United States in controlling the composition of its population."55
Whether one has entered the country determines whether that person
is entitled to deportation or exclusionary proceedings. 56 The INS is
authorized to exclude an alien who has not effected "entry," but the
alien is granted a deportation proceeding if he has "entered" the
United States.57 Deportation proceedings are more advantageous to
the alien because of the many rights and protections they provide.5"
In 1952 Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). 9 One of the purposes of the Act was to alleviate the struggle
"to define what constitutes an entry for immigration purposes."6 In
the INA, Congress provided a statutory definition of "entry."6 Under
the Act, entry is defined as "any coming of an alien into the United
States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession,
whether voluntary or otherwise ...."62
Subsequentjudicial decisions have refined the statutory definition
of entry.65 For example, courts have held that physical presence
within U.S. territory alone does not qualify an alien as having entered
the United States.64 Since the enactment of the INA, BIA case law
has created a more formalized test consisting of three elements which
must be satisfied for an alien to have entered the United States: (1)
a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States, i.e. physical
presence; (2) (a) an inspection and admission by an immigration
the
officer or (b) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at 65
nearest inspection point; and (3) freedom from official restraint.
Thus, courts have endeavored to delineate when and under what

55 Id.

56 Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
57 You Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1547 (3d Cir. 1995).
58 Id. See also supra note 5 for a discussion of the advantages of deportation
proceedings.
59 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The authority to deport or exclude aliens is
not explicitly conferred on Congress by the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court, in
an 1889 case involving Chinese immigrants, held that the power of exclusion is inherent in
a government's sovereignty and thus part of those sovereign powers delegated by the
Constitution. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604, 610 (1889) (Chinese
Exclusion Case).
60 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548 (quoting Mitchell Scott Bloom, Note, The DisproportionateEffect
of the Entry Fiction on Excludable Aliens, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 271, 275 (1989)).
61 Id.
62 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1995).
63 See infra notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
64 Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,213 (1953) (holding that immigrants landing on
Ellis Island has not "entered" the United States).
65 Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1990).
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conditions each of the three elements have been satisfied.66 Previously, a Third Circuit panel held that a crew member who sailed to
Philadelphia had effectuated presence even before the ship arrived in
the port.67 The Vasilatos court went on to say that "[i]t must have
been apparent, long before the fact was emphasized in the 1952
definition, that in a literal and physical sense a person coming from
abroad enters the United States whenever he reaches any land, water
or air space within the territorial limits of this nation."68 The Third
Circuit concluded that "no landing was necessary" for the crew
member to have satisfied the physical presence requirement of
entry.69 Even though later courts relied on the decision in Vasilatos,
it should be noted that this case arose before the INA of 1952 was
enacted. 0
The Vasilatos holding was expressly followed in a post-INA case, In
re Dubbiosi.7 This case involved the crew member of an Italian ship
that arrived in the Port of Hampton Roads, Virginia. 72 The petitioner, Adorno Dubbiosi, was granted a landing permit but was not allowed
to leave the ship until immigration officers had inspected it for stowaways. 7' Having found stowaways on the ship, the petitioner was
charged and taken away under the custody of guards.7 4 The court
held that "[i]n a literal and physical sense Dubbiosi entered the United
States when the [ship] reached the waters within the territorial limits
of this country," but entry had not been accomplished since he was
75
never free from official restraint.
In the case of In re Pierre,6 the BIA refined the definition of entry
by synthesizing BIA case law into four elements: (1) physical presence;
(2) inspection and admission, or intentional evasion of inspection; (3)
actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection
point; and (4) freedom from official restraint. 77 The issue in Pierre
was whether Haitians in a boat had effectuated entry and were thus

66 See infra notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
67 United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1954).
68 Id. at 197.
69 Id. See Lazarescu v. United States, 199 F.2d 898 (4th Cir. 1952). "The port and
harbor of Baltimore is territory of the United States. Entry into that territory even in a vessel
amounted to [entry into the United States] unless [the alien] was under restraint which
prevented his departing from the vessel." Id. at 900-01.
70 Id. See Sing Chou Chung v. Reno, 886 F. Supp. 1172 (M.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd 68 F.3d
1540 (3d Cir. 1995); Xin-Chang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd 55 F.3d
732 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Martin-Plascencia, 532 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1976); In re
Dubbiosi, 191 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Va. 1961).
71 191 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Va. 1961).
72
73
74
75

Id. at 66.

Id.
Id.
Id.

76 14 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1973).
77 Id. at 468.
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entitled to deportation proceedings." The boat was intercepted
within United States territorial waters and then towed to Florida by an
American vessel.79 The BIA concluded that the Haitians had not
"entered" the United States because they were not admitted into the
The BIA implicitly
country nor had they evaded inspection. 0
acknowledged that the immigrants had satisfied the first element of
physical presence by being in U.S. territorial waters: "[w]hile they may
have crossed into the territorial limits of the United States, they were
not admitted by immigration officers, nor did they intentionally evade
inspection."81

The Second Circuit further elucidated the elements necessary to
establish entry in Correa v. Thornburgh. 2 Correa, suspected of being
a drug courier, was detained at an inspection station in a Houston
airport.8 3 After a no-contest plea to the drug charges, the INS
initiated exclusion proceedings against Correa. 4 On appeal, Correa
argued that the district court erred in its determination that she had
not entered the United States and consequently she should be entitled
to deportation proceedings.8 5 Following the entry test set forth in
Pierre, the Second Circuit held that Correa had satisfied the physical
presence test when she disembarked from the airplane, but had failed
to satisfy the "freedom from official restraint" element.8 6 Since
Correa would have been prevented from leaving the inspection area,
she was7 never free from "constraint emanating from the government."
In the same year that Yang was decided, both the Second and
Fourth circuits decided cases involving Chinese immigrants who were
aboard the Golden Venture and sought asylum in the United States. 8
Zhang and Chai, both decided just months prior to Yang, presented
facts almost identical to those in Yang. In Chai, the petitioner, Chen,
applied for asylum asserting that he was "a political dissident who
suffered sterilization in retaliation for his political non-conformity" with

78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 467.
Id.

Id. at 470.
Id. at 469.

901 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1990).
83 Id. at 1169.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1170.
86 Id. at 1171. Regarding the second element of inspection, the Second Circuit noted
that "the more compelling view is that Correa was subject to inspection at any time before
passing through the 'Customs Enclosure' exit control and her immigration inspection and
admission were never completed... [but] [w]e need not resolve this point since it is clear
that Correa never satisfied the third prong of the test .... " Id. at 1172.
87 Id.

8 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll,
48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995).
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China's birth control policy.8 9 Chen, like many of the passengers
aboard the Golden Venture, jumped off the ship after it ran aground.9
While trying to swim ashore Chen was pulled out of the waters by a
rescue boat.9' Chen argued that he had effected entry into the
United States and thus it was inappropriate for the INS to initiate
exclusion proceedings against him. 92 The Fourth Circuit held that
"Chen's mere presence in the territorial waters of the United States
does not constitute an entry into the United States."" Further, Chen
was never free from
official restraint since he was rescued before he
94
ever reached land.
In a similar case, an illegal alien, Xin-Chang Zhang, aboard the
Golden Venture also jumped overboard and attempted to swim
ashore.9 5 Xin-Chang appealed the government's determination that
he had not effected entry and, therefore, was subject to an exclusion
proceeding. 96 In considering whether Zhang had satisfied the
element of physical presence necessary to effectuate entry, the Second
Circuit held:
United States immigration law is designed to regulate the travel [of]
human beings, whose habitat is land, not the comings and goings of fish
or birds. We hold that an alien attempting to enter the United States by
sea had not satisfied the physical presence element of Pierre at least until
he has landed. "

B. The Burden of Prooffor EstablishingEntry
Section 291 of the INA states in pertinent part: "Whenever any
person ... makes application for admission, or otherwise attempts to
enter the United States, the burden of proof shall be upon such
person to establish that he is... not subject to exclusion under any
provision of this chapter .... "98 The BIA has interpreted this statute
as placing the burden of proof on aliens to establish all three elements
of the entry test.99 The appellate courts review de novo the BIA's
interpretation of statutory law;'0 0 however, in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 0' the Supreme Court stated that an agency's

Chai, 48 F.3d at 1335.
90 Id. at 1334.
89

9'

Id.

Id. at 1343.
Id.
94 Id.
95 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995).
96 Id. at 737.
97 Id. at 754. The petitioner in Zhang was able to swim to the beach and presumably
92
93

satisfied the physical presence element, but his claim of entry failed because he was never
free from official restraint once he reached dry land. Id.
98 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994).
99 Matter of G-, No. A-72761974, 1993 WL 522159, at *15 (B.IA Dec. 8, 1993).
100 Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 705 (10th Cir. 1991).
101 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

676
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interpretation is to be granted substantial deference. °2 Because of
the explicit assignment of congressional authority to the administrative
bodies, the Supreme Court held that an agency's legal interpretations
should be "given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."' 3 The Third Circuit has
interpreted Chevron as requiring that the following principles be
applied when reviewing the BIA's interpretation of the INA:
In considering an interpretation adopted by the Board, we must ask
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If
it has not, we may not simply impose [our] own construction on the
statute. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue,the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."°

Thus, under the intervening principles of Chevron, a court must defer

to any reasonable BIA interpretation of an immigration statute where
congressional intent is ambiguous. 0 5 However, "[t] he judiciary is the
final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional
intent." 06
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Chevron, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled that in the
absence of "express statutory provision allocating the burden of
[proof]" the alien should not be required to prove all three elements
of the entry test.0 7 The petitioner, Imane Phelisna, was among two
hundred Haitians attempting to enter the United States by sailing a
boat to Florida. 8 Phelisna and the other Haitians were apprehended after landing on a beach near Miami. 9 The petitioner's claim
that she had entered the United States was denied by the Board
because she had failed to prove intentional evasion of inspection."0
On appeal, the district court stated that "the Board was not correct in
imposing on petitioner more than the burden of proving that she
came physically into the United Sates at some point not in the vicinity
of an inspection station.""' The court reasoned that because "[t]he
government is ordinarily more likely to have ready access to [the] ...
evidence than the alien" the burden of proof properly rests with the

102

Id. For a more extensive analysis of the effect of Chevron on other decisions see Cass

Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990).

467 U.S. at 843-44.
Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1546-47 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Fatin v. INS,
12 F.3d 1233, 1233 (3d Cir. 1993)).
103

104 You

105 Id. at 1546.
106 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
107 In re Application of Phelisna,
108 Id. at 961.
109 Id. at 962.
110 Id. at 963.
III Id.

551 F. Supp. 960, 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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government." 2
In Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, another case involving Chinese
immigrants aboard the Golden Venture, the Second Circuit expressly
overruled the holding in Phelisna as to whom should carry the burden
of proof."' The Second Circuit criticized the lower court's decision
to place the burden of proof on the government by stating that " [t] his
reading of the immigration act is contrary to the reading repeatedly
given by the BIA on this issue."" 4 The Second Circuit cited the
principle set forth in Chevron as requiring the court to give deference
to BIA's interpretation unless the reading of the statute is unreasonable or contrary to Congress's intent."' The court concluded that
since the statute allocating the burden of proof is ambiguous and BIA's
interpretation is not an unreasonable one, the Board's ruling to place
the burden of
proving all elements of the entry test on the alien must
6
be upheld."

IV. The Significance of the Case
The court's decision in Yang has significant implications for the
increasing number of immigrants attempting to enter the United
States." 7 The Third Circuit's ruling that the first element of the
entry test, physical presence, can never be satisfied by mere presence
in U.S. territorial waters has made it more difficult for aliens to
effectuate entry and to acquire, thereby, the right to the more
favorable deportation proceedings." 8 Further, the majority's decision to uphold the BIA's interpretation of the INA"--requiring that
the burden of proving all three elements of the entry test be placed on
the immigrant-lays 2a0 heavy burden on those wishing to establish a
new life in America.

A. The Entry Test
The core of the court's decision is based on its determination that

Id. at 964.
Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 756 (2d Cir. 1995).
114 Id. at 756.
115 Id.
112
"13

116 Id.

117It was reported that over one million legal immigrants applied for citizenship in fiscal
year 1995. FAcrS ON FILE WoRu NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 21, 1995, availableinWestlaw, 1995 WL
11602112. That number was double the applicants in 1993, and it was the highest number
in the 20th century. Id.
118 You Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540 (3d Cir. 1995). The dissent "decline[d] to
accept a bright line rule that an alien must, unequivocally, be on dry land in order to meet
a prong of the entry test." Id. at 1555 (Sarokin, J.,dissenting).
"9 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
120 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1546.
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presence in the territorial waters' of the United States does not
satisfy the physical presence element of the entry test.'2 2 This
restriction on physical presence renders it nearly impossible for the
Yang petitioners to satisfy the third element, freedom from official
restraint.123

The Yang majority began its analysis of the entry test by referring
to the Second and Fourth Circuits' decisions involving other Chinese
immigrants who were aboard the Golden Venture.' 24 In support of its
holding that petitioners had not effected entry, the Third Circuit noted
that both the Second and Fourth circuits held that the element of
physical presence is not met by a person's mere presence in the
territorial waters of the United States. 2 5 The Yang court agreed with
the Second Circuit ruling that "an alien attempting to enter the United
States by sea has not satisfied
the physical presence element... at least
126

until he has landed."

The majority supported its conclusion by distinguishing the Yang
case from the Vasilatos decision which held that physical presence is
effected by crossing into territorial waters.' 27 The Vasilatos court
expressly ruled that the "presence in the United States which is
essential to entry existed when, and even before, the ship arrived in
Philadelphia.' 2' The Yang court discounted the precedential value
of Vasilatosby holding that the ruling was governed by the immigration
laws in existence before Congress enacted the INA.'29 Specifically,
the majority contended that because the definition of "United States"
used by the Vasilatos court was repealed by the INA and replaced by a

121 In 1988, President Reagan extended the territorial waters of the United States from
three miles from the coast to twelve miles. Exec. Order No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989).
122 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1547.
123 Id. The petitioners were approached by officials when they reached the beach;
therefore, they were not free from official restraint because their physical presence was
effectuated when they reached land. Id. However, if they had satisfied the physical requirement element in the water, then they might have shown that they were free from
restraint while in the water. Id.
124 Id. The two circuit court cases were Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d
Cir. 1995) and Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995), respectively.
125 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1547.
126 Id. (quoting Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 754 (2d Cir. 1995)).
127 Id. at 1547-48. See United States v. Vasilatos, 209 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1954). It was the
Vasitatos case that the District Court cited as mandating a departure from the decisions of the
Second and Fourth Circuits and requiring it to hold that the petitioners had achieved
physical presence in the United States upon entering its territorial waters. Sing Chou Chung
v. Reno, 886 F. Supp. 1172, 1179 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
128 Vasilatos, 209 F.2d at 197.
129 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548. The majority quotes the Senate Report on the INA in support
of its contention: "[t]he purpose of the bill is to repeal all immigration and nationality laws
and to enact a completely revised immigration and nationality code." Id. (quoting S. REP.
No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952)). However, the court does not mention that Vasilatos,
despite the fact that it was decided prior to the enactment of the INA, has been consistently
relied upon by other courts. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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statutorial definition, 3 ° the Third Circuit's previous ruling was not
However, as the dissent
binding on the Third Circuit in Yang.'
noted, there is no mention in the Vasilatos opinion about interpreting
the term "United States."' 32 Rather, the dissent argued, the Vasilatos
court "believed that the 1952 definition of 'entry' actually 'emphasized'. its conclusion that a person is physically present in the United
By following the
States upon crossing into territorial waters."'
reasoning of the Second and Fourth Circuits, the Third Circuit seemed
to reject the holding in Vasilatos. Instead of expressly overturning the
Vasilatos decision, the Yang court attempted to distinguish the two
cases.1 4 Despite the court's efforts, the Vasilatos case, as noted by
other courts, stands for the proposition that one has entered the
United States before reaching land. 5 Because the Third Circuit
chose to follow the non-binding decisions in the Second and Fourth
circuits while disregarding its own precedent, it was forced to try and
differenciate Vasilatos from Yang. 36 However, the court's argument
probably would have been stronger if it had stated that it had expressly
rejected the holding in Vasilatos instead of creating unpersuasive
differences between the two cases.
Finally, the Yang majority asserted that the statutory definition of
United States in the INA" 7 should be interpreted as not including
The plain language of the statutory definithe territorial waters.'
tion provides support for the court's ruling. 9 The term "territorial
water" is conspicuously absent from the definition of entry which
implicitly illustrates Congress's desire that it not be included in the
definition. The Supreme Court's guidelines for statutory interpretation articulated in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca' 4° support this reading."'
In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court stated "[w]here Congress
includes-particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. "142 Thus, the fact that "territorial waters" is included in other

130See supra note 41.
131 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548.
132 Id. at 1553 (Sarokin, J., dissenting).
133Id. (Sarokin, J., dissenting).
134 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548.
'35 In re Dubbiosi 191 F. Supp. 65, 66 (E.D. Va. 1961).
See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
13 Yang 68 F.3d at 1548.
1378 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (38)(1988).
1'8 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1548.
139 See supra note 41.
140480 U.S. 421 (1987).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 432 (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (1972)).
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definitions of the United States 4 ' suggests that the court properly
interpreted its absence as an intentional omission by Congress.
Further, as one commentator has noted, recent immigration decisions
"reflect the [Supreme] Court's growing adherence to the 'plain
meaning' approach to statutory interpretation and the application of
that doctrine to the immigration laws."' 4
This reading of the definition is also supported by the Second
Circuit's decision in Zhang.145 The Zhang court held that the immigration laws are only intended to regulate the activities of aliens while
they are on dry land. 46 Thus, the territorial waters of the United
States are not relevant for determining if an alien has entered the
country.
The Yang dissent "think[s] the majority misreads the current
statute when it concludes that the term 'United States' for purposes of
entry does not include territorial waters ....
Contradicting the
court's position, the dissent argued that section 215,"4 referred
to by the majority, "actually demonstrates that Congress did envision
that an alien could be physically present in the United States for
purposes of entry by crossing into the territorial waters." ' ° The
dissent's argument seemed to miss the point of section 215. The
expanded definition of "United States" in section 215 can be explained
by the purpose of that section, which is to regulate the travel of
citizens and aliens during times of war or emergency. 151 It seems
plausible to argue that Congress intended to expand the definition of
"United States" in this section due to the context in which it is found.
Thus, contrary to the dissent's assertion, it does not necessarily follow
",'4

143 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185(c) (1988). "The term
'United States' as used inthis section includes the Canal Zone, and all territory and waters,
continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Id.
144 Keven R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion:" The Plain Meaning of
Executive Branch Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 418 (1993). See, e.g., INS v.
Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 194 (1984) (refusing to ignore the "clear congressional mandate
and the plain meaning of the statute" where "Congress considered the harsh consequences
of its actions"); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 798 (1977) (stating that the Court was constrained
by the plain language of an INA provision defining the term "child").
145 Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995).
146 Id. at 754.
147 Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1553 (3d Cir. 1995) (Sarokin, J., dissenting). More
specifically, Judge Sarokin contended that the word "continental" found in the statutory
definition should be used solely to distinguish the forty-eight contiguous states from the
offshore states and territories. Id. (Sarokin, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 1554 (Sarokin,J., dissenting).
149 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1)(1994).
150 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1554 (Sarokin,J., dissenting). The dissent also questions how the
majority would define dry land for entry purposes: "[d]oes [physical presence] mean
touching shore that is not covered by any water at all? What is the effect of high and low
tides? Has an alien reached dry land upon standing on a beach that is moist with ocean
water, or does the sand need to be perfectly dry?" Id. at 1554 (Sarokin,J., dissenting).
151Id.at 1548.
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that the definition found in section 215 is applicable to the one found
in section 101 because the circumstance under which either may be
applied is different.
The Yang court felt it unnecessary to rule on whether the second
element'52 had been satisfied since both the district court and the
government conceded that the petitioners actually and intentionally
evaded inspection.'53 However, the Third Circuit noted in dicta that
"since the first element of the entry test (physical presence) can only
be satisfied on dry land, it follows that the second element (actual or
intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point) must
also be satisfied on dry land." ' 4 While this may be logically consistent with the physical presence requirement, it ignores those instances
where immigration inspections occur while at sea.' 55
The dissent urged the court to accept a balancing test to
determine if the second element has been met rather than the bright
line rule that inspection can only occur on dry land.'5 6 Judge
Sarokin suggests several factors which might be considered in deciding
whether the second element had been satisfied:
(1) whether an incoming vessel is heading toward an inspection site or
is intending to avoid any; (2) the proximity of the vessel to an inspection
site; (3) the distance traveled within the boundaries of the United States
without encountering an inspection site or an inspection officer; (4)
whether the vessel had reached a harbor or other protected area as
opposed to being in the open sea; and (5) the presence or absence of
government
ships or airplanes that could interdict or observe incoming
57
vessels.1

The majority held that the third element of the entry test,
freedom from official restraint, could only be satisfied after physical
presence had been established; holding freedom while outside United
States territory was "irrelevant" for entry analysis.15 In reaching the
decision, the Third Circuit expressly rejected the analysis of the Ninth
Circuit in U.S. v. Martin-Plascencia.5 9 The Ninth Circuit held that an
illegal alien effected entry even though the alien failed to make it past
the confines of the port of entry at San Ysidro. 1' Even though the
152 The second element requires "(a) an inspection and admission by an immigration
officer or (b) actual or intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point."
Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1990).
153 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1549.

154

Id.

155 Id. at 1555 (Sarokin, J., dissenting).

For example, the Coast Guard intercepted
Haitian refugees as they fled from Haiti in the early 1990s.
156 Id. (Sarokin, J., dissenting).
Id.
158 Id. at 1549.
159 Id. See also United States v. Martin-Placencia, 532 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
157

429 U.S. 894 (1976) (holding that a Mexican juvenile had entered the United States by
avoiding immigration officials and scaling a concrete wall at the port of entry).
160 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1549.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.

[Vol. 21

petitioners in Yang had reached the beach before being detained by
officials, the majority ruled that "the mere fact that [the alien] may
have eluded the gaze of law enforcement for a brief period of time
after having come upon United States territory is insufficient, in and
of itself, to establish freedom from official restraint."161 Thus, the
issue of freedom from official restraint is left unsettled between the two
circuit courts. However, the Third Circuit's position is arguably the
more sustainable based on previous case law.'62 The Correa court
held that the petitioner was never free from official restraint since she
did not leave the confines of the inspection area within the airport.' 6 This ruling seems to support the Third Circuit's conclusion
that monetary freedom is insufficient to establish freedom from official
restraint.164

The Yang decision, in concert with Zhang and Chai, properly
narrows the entry test by requiring that an alien be on dry land before
physical presence can be effected. 65 The entry fiction was created
so those who had some connection to America could have a better
chance of being admitted to this country.'66 If it is a connection to
this country that the entry fiction is supposed to recognize, then the
majority's holding appropriately restricted physical presence to dry
land. It is unlikely that an alien's connection with the United States
is to be found twelve miles out to sea. Furthermore, the entry fiction
entitles those who succeed in entering the United States illegally the
constitutional benefits inherent in deportation proceedings. While
those who attempt, but fail, to enter by following routine immigration
procedures are denied those same protections in their exclusion

161 Id. at 1550. Since the dissent contends that the petitioners were physically present
in the United States upon entering U.S. territorial waters, it examines whether official restraint was achieved before the petitioners reached shore. Id. at 1556 (Sarokin, J.,
dissenting). Judge Sarokin argued that Section 271 (a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1321 (a) (1994)
has been "interpreted to mean that aliens who are physically present in the United States are
nonetheless under official restraint by virtue of the duty placed on the owner... or agent
of the vessel." Id. (Sarokin,J., dissenting).
162 Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1990). See also Matter of Pierre,
14 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1973) (holding that Haitian refugees had not "entered" the United
States because they were never free from official restraint).
165 Id. at 1172.
164 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1550.
165 To hold otherwise would, at least theoretically, enable an alien who is ten miles off
shore, who evades a Coast Guard ship (inspection point), and who is not and has not been
under surveillance by U.S. officials (freedom from official restraint) to have officially
"entered" the United States and to be entitled to the constitutional protections inherent in
deportation proceedings. This seems especially inequitable when contrasted to the alien who
comes to the United States through legal channels and who is subjected to exclusion
proceedings because they did not try to circumvent immigration officials.
166 See David A. Martin, Due Process and the Treatment of Aliens, 44 U. PrrT. L. RE. 165,
180-90 (1983).
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proceeding. 67 Thus, there is a significant incentive for people to
undertake illegal and dangerous efforts, as with the Golden Venture, to
enter the United States. In order to reduce this disparate effect, the
court correctly narrowed the definition of entry to those activities
which occur on land. 68
B. Burden of Proof
The Third Circuit concluded that the burden of proving all three
elements of the entry test should be placed upon the alien.1 69 In
reversing the district court's determination that aliens were only
required to prove they had physically entered the United States, the
Third Circuit noted that the primary case relied upon by the lower
court was expressly overruled by7 the Second Circuit 7 ° three days
after the district court's decision.1 '
Following the reasoning of the Second Circuit, the Yang court
deferred to the BIA's interpretation of the statute 172 allocating the
burden of proof for determining entry.17 ' The majority held that the
standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Chevron174 constrain the
court from imposing its own construction of an ambiguous statute
where the BIA has proffered its own interpretation, "[r]ather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for' the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." 171 Under this low threshconcluded that the BIA's interpretation was not
old, the Third Circuit
76
unreasonable.1
The dissent acknowledged the Second Circuit's reversal of Phelisna;
nevertheless, it asserted that the conclusion and, consequently, the
decision in Yang were erroneous even within the statutory framework
delineated by the Supreme Court in Chevron.177 The dissent did not
"find the BIA's statutory interpretation reasonable and thus deter167 Mitchell Scott Bloom, Note, The DisporportionateEffect of the Enty Fiction on Excludable
Aliens, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 271 (1989).
168 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1550.
169 Id.

170 In Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit held
that since the BIA's interpretation of the INA was not unreasonable regarding the burden
of proof, the court was required to uphold the agency's interpretation. Id. In doing so, the
Second Circuit overruled the holding in In re Application of Phelisna, 551 F. Supp. 960
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
171 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1546. The government sought reconsideration after the Zhang
decision was handed down, but the district court rejected the reasoning of the Second
Circuit. Id.
172 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1987).
173 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1546.
174 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
175 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1547 (quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993)).
176 Id.

177 Id. at 1558 (Sarokin, J., dissenting).
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mine [d] it need not be accorded deference."' 78 In particular, Judge
Sarokin contended that placing the burden of proving the third
element, official restraint, on the alien would be especially onerous
because the majority's allocation of proof would require that the alien
prove a negative. 9 The dissent argued that because mere observation by surveillance is a form of official restraint8 ° it would be
unreasonable to expect aliens to prove something they do not even
know: "it is unreasonable, impossible and inequitable to call upon the
passengers aboard Golden Venture to prove they had not been under
[radar] surveillance ...."1181
Thus, according to the Yang decision, immigrants would be forced
to show that the government was not watching them via video or radar
at any time during their attempt to enter the United States." 2
Moreover, it would seem that the government is in a better position to
prove whether they had an alien under surveillance. For example, the
government has better access to their own surveillance equipment and
could easily determine whether they had been following a vessel on
radar. The difficulty of proving a negative (official restraint),
combined with the fact that the government is in a better position to
establish the occurence of official restraint, undermines the majority's
rationale that allocating the burden of proof for all three elements was
reasonable.
The Chevron decision allows courts to make the final determination
when a statute is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is
unreasonable. 3 Both the Second and Third circuits have conceded
that the language in the statute regarding the burden of proof to show
entry is ambiguous.8 4 Thus, the question becomes whether an
agency's interpretation of the ambiguous statute is reasonable. 5 As
noted above, the BIA's reading of the statute requiring the alien to
show all three elements is inequitable and unreasonable, especially
regarding the element of official restraint. Under the Chevron
guidelines, courts are to give deference to an agency's interpretation
only when it is reasonable, and they are to offer their own reading
when it is not.'8 6 Unfortunately, it appears that the Third Circuit
missed the opportunity to correct the BIA's unreasonable interpretation of INA § 101 in favor of a more equitable and practical solution.

178 Id.

179 Id. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
180 In re Pierre, 14 I & N Dec. 467 (BIA 1973).
181 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1558 (Sarokin,J., dissenting).
182 Id. (Sarokin,J., dissenting).
183 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
184 Yang, 68 F.3d at 1540; Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2d Cir. 1995).
185 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
186 Id.
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Conclusion

A series of unfavorable appellate court decisions for passengers
aboard the Golden Venture culminated in Yang. Together, the holdings
in Chai, Zhang, and Yang seem to represent a concerted judicial effort,
encouraged by the Administration," 7 to discourage illegal migration
by promulgating restrictive rulings and a "get-tough" policy on
immigration."M In part, the U.S. government is concerned with the
slave-like conditions in which smuggled immigrants are forced to live
and work upon their arrival in America." 9 Thus, a more restrictive
immigration policy is defended on the grounds that it not only helps
prevent the entry of illegal aliens, but it also protects some immigrants
from being victimized and enslaved by the smugglers and drug
dealers 9 ° who bring them to the United States. However, there is
concern that such efforts could lead to a policy that is too restrictive
toward immigrants who want and deserve to be in America. 9 1 The
government's hard-line approach to Chinese immigration in particular
may jeopardize the rights of individuals who have legitimate claims to
political asylum under current U.S. immigration law. By increasingly
rejecting asylum claims from Chinese immigrants the government runs
the risk of denying refuge to those who may face persecution if forced
to return home. 19 Despite the political pressure often associated
with immigration issues, the courts should resist subjugating the law to
political rhetoric. 9
The decision in Yang traversed too far along the path of exclusion
to the point where it unfairly deprived aliens of their chance at
freedom. Even though the court rightly held that physical presence
can only occur on dry land, it went too far in allocating the entire

187

Nancie L. Katz, Asylum Rules Debated as '93 Chinese Refugees Remain Jailed, DALLAS

MORNING NEWS, Apr. 23, 1995, at 10A.

188 There is some evidence to suggest that this hard-line approach is having an effect on
smuggling operations. Hollis Engley, Chinese Prisonersin Pennsylvania Bring Together a Diverse
Community, GANNETr NEws SERVICE, Sept. 6, 1995. The INS stated that their deterrent efforts
have been successful; additionally, they claimed that no Chinese boats have reached the
United States since the Golden Venture incident. Id.
189 Don Van Natta, Jr., Sweatshop Job Abuse Worsening, Workers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1995, at BI (discussing Secretary of Labor Robert Reich's visit to sweatshops in New York
City).
190 Recently released information has exposed a strong link between Asian heroin trade
and alien smuggling. Christopher S. Wren, HeroinIndictments Link Drugs to Smuggling ofAliens,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at B3.
191 See Sara Ignatius, Restricting The Rights of Asylum Seekers: The New Legislative and
AdministrativeProposals,7 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 225 (1994) (discussing legislation proposed by
the Clinton Administration to limit asylum rights).
192 Id.
193 Especially in this election year, political candidates, led by Pat Buchanan, have used
social and economic insecurity as a rallying cry to severely limit immigration. John Marelius,
Dole, at border,favors U.S. law like Prop. 187, S.D. UNIoN-TRIB., Mar. 23, 1996, at Al.
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burden of proof to the immigrant. Requiring the alien to establish all
three elements of the test would, in certain circumstances, require the
person to prove a negative.194 Further, the government is often in
the best position to prove the second and third elements of the entry
test.' 95 Finally, shifting the burden of proof, in conjunction with the
strict "dry land" requirement regarding physical presence, creates a
standard too onerous for proving entry. After all, proving that one has
entered the United States does not entitle one to stay in America, it
only determines which type of deportation hearing one will receive.1 96 The vagueness of the statute and the misplaced deference
to the BIA should prompt Congress to clarify the statue such that it
fairly allocates the burden of proof between the government and the
immigrant.
DAVID TEEPLES

194 For example, the alien may be forced to prove he is not under surveillance by
person, video, or radar to show freedom from official restraint. See supra notes 180-82 and
accompanying text.
195 See You Yi Yang v. Maugans, 68 F.3d 1540, 1558 (3d Cir. 1995), (Sarokin, J.,
dissenting). See also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
196 See supra note 5.

